An effective general election strategy for the Opposition

By Little Bird With Talons

The ideas presented here have been previously discussed in a little booklet under the same title, published in 2004 by an independent think tank called the 23rd Recon Group. This is an off-take from that same booklet.

The general elections are coming around again. The next GE will be a watershed for the future of our nation, because if Abdullah Ahmad Badawi rules for another five years and there are no serious reforms initiated by the BN, the economy, especially the bumiputra economy, will grind to a halt and the country will degenerate into chaos. Unless the UMNO party gets rid of its president and gives the country a new Prime Minister, the coming general elections will see the BN take the country to its doom. But as things are, the Barisan Nasional will form the Government yet another time. This scenario keeps repeating itself because the electorate does not have much choice.

The protest by Bersih, the unprecedented expression of exasperation under the banner of Hindraf, the march by the lawyers, the protest in Batu Buruk, the earlier protests against the Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur by businessmen in Kuala Lumpur, another protest by over 2,000 Indians at the Prime Minister’s office in Putrajaya, the public outcry over the Revathi case and the religious fanatics showing boisterous behaviour after the Lina Joy verdict, are all signs of a system which is breaking down. We have been postponing our doom, but with Abdullah Badawi as Prime Minister the end is guaranteed.

But the fact is, UMNO will not get rid of Abdullah Badawi. Neither is the BN going to reform anything. And finally, the Opposition is not sufficiently organised or possess enough ‘national level’ candidates to present a viable alternative to the electorate.

We are doomed.

At the end of the day, in the final analysis, our country is still a democracy where people cast their votes at the ballot box. And the sad truth is, the electorate is not ready for the Opposition to rule the country. They will not vote for the Opposition in sufficient numbers. Compounding this issue is the fact that elections in Malaysia are also believed to be rigged. The role of the Elections Commission in re-delineating the boundaries and gerrymandering the constituencies makes the task even more difficult for the Opposition.

But facts are facts. Even at the BN’s weakest points in recent history (the Tengku Razaleigh-Mahathir split in 1988 and the Anwar Ibrahim issue in 1998) the BN still romped home easily with a two thirds majority. In 2004, the BN almost made a clean sweep at the ballot. However, the last four years of Abdullah Badawi’s administration have been disappointing. The general populace, including a large number of Malays and BN supporters, are more aware of the inept, corrupt and plain dishonest administration in Putrajaya. The population really wants to see changes through the ballot. However, their choices are limited. Hence the BN will rule again.

But behind every cloud there is always a silver lining. The Opposition must use an effective strategy to allay the fears of the majority voters yet gain limited but penetrating wins at the ballot. The strategy outlined herewith seeks to achieve this objective. The BN must be allowed to win the elections but the Opposition must make significant gains too which will assist the silent majority put a check on the BN’s excesses.

On Nomination Day, the Opposition MUST NOT contest in 60% of Parliamentary seats (some suggest 51% or 55%). This means that on Nomination Day the BN would form the Federal Government with 60% of the Parliamentary seats won without contest. However, the Opposition must contest the remaining 40% of the Parliamentary seats, carefully spread out throughout the country and strategically chosen to ensure an Opposition win. They must campaign aggressively in these 40% of Parliamentary seats. On Polling Day, there is a very high chance that the voters will cast votes of strong support as well as sympathy and protest votes for the Opposition.

This scenario has a very high chance of success. If this scenario is successful the Opposition will control 40% or 79 seats in Parliament. This is more than anything the Opposition parties have achieved in the past 37 years of electioneering.

It is better to allow the BN to win 60% seats uncontested rather than 51% or 55% because the majority of voters will be too frightened if the BN is given too slim a margin of victory. 60% is just about the correct comfort level. Malaysians are not ready to take the plunge with the Opposition. They do not want to rock the boat. The majority of voters will be happy to give the Opposition 40% of Parliamentary seats ONLY if they are assured that the BN will have a 60% stake in Parliament.

That takes care of Parliament.

At the State level, on Nomination Day the Opposition must concede 60% of seats uncontested to the BN in nine (9) states – i.e., Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Pahang, Sarawak and Sabah. Again, this means that on Polling Day the BN would form the State Government in these nine states with a 60% uncontested majority. However, the Opposition must field candidates in the remaining 40% of seats in these nine States. On Polling Day it is again very likely that the voters will deliver the remaining 40% of the State seats to the Opposition. If this strategy is successful, then the Opposition will control hundreds of seats across nine State Legislatures. This will be unprecedented for the Opposition.

In the remaining four (4) States – i.e. Penang, Selangor, Kelantan and Terengganu – the Opposition must field candidates in all seats and make their intention clear that the Opposition wants to form the Government in these four States. Why just these four States? Answer: The Opposition simply does not have any chance to win the majority in the other nine States. With aggressive campaigning and careful planning, the Opposition may be just able to convince the voters to give their full support in these four States; i.e. Penang, Selangor, Kelantan and Terengganu.

Why Penang, Selangor, Kelantan and Terengganu? Kelantan is a Pas stronghold and can remain so. Terengganu has already fallen to Pas twice before and may fall yet again, without much effort. The majority of Malays will be happy that Pas, which is still a Malay Islamist party, rules two States. The ‘ketuanan Melayu’ status quo will not be too ruffled.

Penang is necessary to show that the Opposition can cooperate to rule an important State. If they win, the Opposition must rule Penang jointly between the DAP and Parti Keadilan. The Chief Minister can be from DAP with the Deputy from Keadilan. Penang has always had a Chinese Chief Minister. Penangites may just be ready for Mr Lim Kit Siang to be the next Chief Minister. Dr Wan Azizah could be the Deputy.

Selangor is the plum in the pudding. Using this strategy, Selangor may just fall to the Opposition. If the Opposition wins in Selangor, it can become a showcase of cooperation between Pas, DAP and Keadilan to rule the wealthiest and most industrialised State in the country. The Menteri Besar of Selangor can be from Keadilan with deputies from the DAP and Pas. Selangor can be a proving ground to show that the Opposition can cooperate to rule the entire country – the next move up the ladder in 2012 or 2017.

Perhaps never before in the history of our country have so many people been so disappointed and dejected with the BN Government. The moment is now and the Opposition must seize this moment. This opportunity will not come around again for a long time.

On the other hand, if the Opposition just goes head-to-head against the BN in all constituencies like they have always done, it is just another waste of time, resources, money and opportunity. The Opposition is not going to win much in a one-on-one contest against the BN in every constituency. They will not even dent the BN’s two-thirds majority. Remember, in 1990 and 1999 the BN still walked home with two-thirds intact. That was perhaps the BN’s weakest performance.

If the Opposition decides to adopt the strategy proposed here, they need to quickly make known to the voters who are their candidates for all the Constituencies they will be contesting and who will be the Menteri Besar, Chief Minister, etc., if they win in Penang and Selangor (Kelantan and Terengganu are not an issue). The advantage of the BN is that the voters know well in advance who the candidates are and who will most likely be the Menteri Besar of a BN Government. This is important for the voters. This is why the Opposition must also make known who are their candidates.

By using this strategy the Opposition, who are perennially constrained by a lack of heavyweight candidates, needs only 80 high-calibre and capable candidates to contest in 80 Parliamentary constituencies (the 40%). The Opposition can then focus all its joint efforts and strength to campaign in just 80 Parliamentary constituencies.

If the Opposition goes after all 220 Parliamentary seats, they will only stretch themselves thin. The Opposition does not have the resources, muscle and money to match the BN in every Constituency. The same argument applies for the State seats. By limiting their objectives and contesting in only selected State seats, the Opposition will be able to put more resources and campaign more effectively.

This is an effective strategy that will generate a significant victory for the Opposition and ensure the Opposition has a large role to play in the country. No Joint Manifestos are needed for this strategy. If this strategy works, and it will, it will also mark the end of the BN juggernaut. The BN will be cut down to size. This is what makes this strategy so attractive. It gives the majority of Malaysian voters the familiarity (not the comfort) of having a BN Government in power yet cut down to size and checked by a strong Opposition.

To the leaders of the Opposition I hope you will grab this golden opportunity. These conditions will not come around again. Plan well and strategise well. With proper strategic planning much can be achieved.