Mission Impossible in Sarawak?
By Hakim Joe
How difficult is it to campaign as the opposition in Sarawak? That is not the pertinent question as the more relevant one should be “how hard will the authorities make it for the opposition to campaign in Sarawak?”
Sadly this is a fact of life for the opposition politicians here in this country, and especially in the eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah. Why especially in these two states? The answer lies in the fact that these states act as the guarantee that BN hangs on to power no matter what happens in the peninsula.
Sarawak is Malaysia’s largest state, comprising 124,450 square kilometers, and is as large as the entire Malaysian Peninsula, but with only a population of approximately 2.5 million, it is the least densely populated state in the country. It is also the second poorest state (behind Kelantan) despite its immense resources (timber, petroleum, LNG, palm oil, cocoa and pepper).
Politics in the state of Sarawak is a mixture of geography and demography. Geography because the different homogenous natives tend to cohabit together (except in the urban areas) and demography because of its 40 sub-ethnic groupings, each with its own distinct language, culture, beliefs, standard of living and political inclinations.
Henceforth it is this multiplicity that the critical issue of representation is perpetually tarnished by ethnicity. To gain prominence and dominance in Sarawak requires the formation of a coalition of political parties as no single party are capable of gaining sufficient popular vote to govern the entire state. It is consequently essential that any political party that has designs for the state government is compulsorily required to customize its campaign issues along these diversified ethnicity, something along the lines of “horses for courses”.
This is the reason why BN has remained in power in Sarawak ever since its incorporation into Malaysia, always portraying the role of the “big brother” as no ethnic political party possesses the power to go alone. The Ibans, with a 30% population base, is unable to garner sufficient common support to form the state government singularly, similarly the Malays-Melanaus (27.5%) and the Chinese (26%) are unable to do so as well. There is therefore a basic need for an adhesive force and it was summarily provided by Umno.
The non-Muslim Ibans and the Chinese could somehow have formed a coalition of their own and possibly acquire sufficient popular support to form a state government but each viewed the other with suspicion, and appended by shrewd political maneuvers by Umno, made this partnership untenable from the very beginning. Consequently, the Malay-Melanaus sneaked in through the back door, aided by Umno, to claim the position of Menteri Beasr and by default, the control of the state government.
In the peninsula, this is accomplished through the utilization of racial segregation in the form of religion and the exploitation of parties like MCA and MIC to split the racial vote. Over in Sarawak, ethnicity comes into play, not race not religion. The federal government will do everything within (and beyond) its powers to ascertain that this status quo remains intact as it is primarily this reinforced diversity that permits them to manipulate the voters into supporting the coalition. Keeping (and maintaining) the voters ignorant is but one minute part in their grand strategy to preserve control over the state but this gained significance after the political tsunami last year. Dishing out small incentives whilst keeping them poor is altogether another scheme in this grand strategy of politics ala Malaysian style.
The third and most crucial of all is to impede the voters from getting information. That is accomplished by making it as difficult as possible for the opposition political party’s propaganda machinery to gain access to the voters. Umno alone is incapable of performing this action and here is where the state government, through its administrative arm, pays its dues to the federal government. It is not helped by the fact that the security forces and certain federal agencies have shown a tendency to only perform their duties in accordance to the wishes of the incumbent federal government.
First and foremost, we have the electoral system where constituencies are shaped in accordance to boundaries and not population. A win for the opposition in Pending (29,503 voters) represents one state seat as is a win for the government in Ba’Kelalan (6,284 voters). The subtle art of gerrymandering at its best as exhibited in the 2001 state elections where BN won 98.3% of the seats while only obtaining 71.9% of the popular vote.
Two, can a party nominate and register a candidate for a state election if that particular political party has been deregistered? The obvious answer is no, as discovered by PBDS in 2006. Similar question, can a party nominate and register a candidate for a state election if that particular political party has its application for registration denied? The obvious answer is again no, as found out by the Malaysian Dayak Congress (MDC), also in 2006. Hell, even a “temporary suspension” or “application pending approval” is sufficient to stop any party from participating in the elections (it will be 5 years later before they can even think about it again). Petitioning to the High Court is of no consequence as the polls cannot be stopped or delayed once its had been announced by the Elections Commission (EC), and when have you seen a judgment being made in haste except if it is beneficial to the government?
Three, the delimitation exercise held every eight years by the EC. This is when gerrymandering is performed officially and legally, where new electoral boundaries are drawn and new constituencies created/old constituencies combined/removed. Since state elections are held every five years, this exercise can be initiated months prior to the polls, and to the advantage of the people in the know. Two perpetually anti-government constituencies can be combined into one, as is possible for a single pro-government constituency to be split into two, or vice versa. Since 1970, the number of state seats in the Sarawak State Assembly has increased from 48 to 71 (or 56%).
Four, the electoral roll, its accuracy and the postal votes. How many times have we heard of phantom voters where the dead rose from their graves to be present at the polling booths, or of double registration (vote stuffing) where a voter is able to cast his vote twice or once each at two different constituencies? And then there are the multiple voters living at the same address. Perhaps a large family of 200 plus living together? Additionally, there are the “someone has voted in place of the legitimate voter”, “I can’t find your name on the electoral roll even though you have voted here since Merdeka” and the evergreen vote-en-masse postal votes which surprisingly always never fail to favor the government. The worst part is that the head of the EC is a political appointee and reports directly to the Prime Minister’s department.
Five, the appointment of District Officers (DO) as the Election Returning Officers. DOs are appointed by the state bureaucracy, which makes the MB their ultimate boss. A different boss from a different party might sack (or even worse, investigate) the existing DOs and replace them with others – not a good thing altogether, not for the existing DO anyway. You get what I mean.
Six, federal legislations. Elections are held within this legal framework, so are the political campaigning. To highlight the importance of this, here are a few good examples. If a candidate suspects the Returning Officer of committing electoral fraud, he cannot take any action because in March 2000, the electoral law was amended whereby the Election Commission and returning officers may not be named as “necessary parties” in a writ, and in July 2000, Parliament passed a bill to amend the electoral laws, prohibiting judicial inspection of voter rolls after the EC has officially certified them.
Seven, the security forces and their unquestionable authority to approve or deny any application(s) for permit(s) to hold political rallies, public meetings (or candlelight vigils). When the opposition political parties are only allowed such events (excluding the candlelight vigils) in the few days prior to the Election Day, what can these candidates humanly perform to convince the voters? Traveling in Sarawak is not exactly the embodiment of what “rural” actually means. It’s worse. Traveling the large distances compounds the difficulty and allows less time for them to be doing the actual campaigning. As the incumbent, the government would have forewarned their candidates and thence having a advantageous head start. (Example, the candidate might be able to reserve all the halls in the constituency to prevent the opponent from doing so.)
Eight, allocation of state resources. This means the amount of funds that is granted to the state government by the federal government. The more monetary resources granted, the more it can be used by the state government to “convince” the voters of their decision. In Sarawak where it is the second poorest state, the impact is far greater than say in Selangor. Fifty Ringgit to an unemployed native living in a dilapidated longhouse deep inside the Sarawak forest is a godsend. The similar sum given to a working class Selangor resident can’t even help him top up the petrol tank of his imported automobile or be sufficient to pay for his buffet dinner at the Shangri-la Hotel.
Nine, the War-Chest. Going on the campaign trail in Sarawak is no straightforward affair as the large distances between the constituencies increases the logistical cost of a candidate. Flyers, adverts, flags, posters and a whole array of election essentials (vehicles, food, petrol, campaign workers, caps, t-shirts, booking of halls, tents, etc) do not come cheap. Yes, the EC have laws limiting what a candidate can spend in his election campaign but even a semi-clever accountant would have lodged all of it as contributions from a supporter, distributed by the supporter and beyond the control of the candidate. (Pakatan supporters having contributed to their favored PR candidate even get a surprise tour of MACC.)
Sarawak is one of the states where a disparity of population versus registered voters is extremely high. Only a third of the populace has ever bothered to register themselves as voters and the turnout at the polling day is horrendous (between 50% to 73.5% in the 2006 state elections). It has a higher male voter count (50.7%, circa 2006) as well as a higher proportion of older voters (81.8% over 35 years old, circa 2006).
For Pakatan to have any chance of hampering BN’s objective of obtaining a two-thirds majority in the state assembly again (let alone winning), it is imperative that they start campaigning now, or at least show some kind of presence, and more importantly to influence the younger Sarawakians to, first register as voters and next to actually come out to vote in the next state elections. Allowing the 2008 (peninsula) Political Tsunami to work its wonders is, at best, a forlorn hope only – nothing substantial at all. The next Sarawak State Election will be the essential indicator to conclude if Pakatan grows to be a real contender, or yet another dreamer.
This is the best opportunity ever. Don’t fuck it up.
