The Budget Facade and the Poverty of The Political Debate

Farish’s unusually hard hitting criticism can in fact be extended to reflect the dire frustration faced by a few of us in having to confront “gibberish” not only by politicians, but regrettably also by academics, bureaucrats and self-styled social commentators in the extended political debate on race and ethnic relations as well.

By Dr Collin Abraham

On the basis of relevant theoretical frameworks for development, the budget is deceptive because it focuses primarily on the elitist based top-bottom economic growth model, to the detriment of the socially determined power-sharing of the political
economy by the stake holders of the Nation from the bottom-top.

But this is not new. It can be asserted with authority that the formulation of the entire planning process for development since independence has been anchored on the economic growth model formulated on the basis of the experiences of western democracies that had been simply adopted in toto in Malaysia.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the theoretical and empirical cross-dimensional implications of this scenario, but interestingly recent articles by Farish Noor and Azly Rahman online, as well as Agoes Salim in the print media (2009) are
particularly relevant to such analysis. They provide some excellent pointers as to the origins for the adoption of the growth model and some constraints for the paucity of other more realistic options. Readers will most certainly benefit for these analyses to which I will most humbly add my own “take” subsequently.

Farish Noor’s strong indictment of the political debate, as being comparable to “gossip” engaged in by “desperate housewives” (M’kini 6/10), may need to be further conceptually analyzed identifying causal factors and suggesting remedial measures, but his immediate comment of the extremely poor quality of the debate suggests that the capacity and capability among academics, professionals and the “think tanks” to contribute meaningfully is seriously lacking. Indeed, one cannot escape the conclusion that in making (a-theoretical) submissions that are impressionistic, simplistic and superficial these so-called “experts” and the unsolicited comments by some VIPs, may in fact be making the situation worse by the presentation of a scenario that is not sustainable in terms of national integration and national unity.

In this connection, as an internationally recognized political scientist, Farish’s unusually hard hitting criticism can in fact be extended to reflect the dire frustration faced by a few of us in having to confront “gibberish” not only by politicians, but regrettably also by academics, bureaucrats and self-styled social commentators in the extended political debate on race and ethnic relations as well. As a result much of our researched published work including that commissioned by UN agencies calling for reforms and for specific measures such as the appointment of an Ombudsman have failed to be implemented. Indeed, at least in one particular instance, had the UNDP report on the Social Impact Assessment of Felda (2002) been implemented, the disgraceful blatant “cheating” of settlers could at least have been avoided, if not even prevented.

Azly Rahman has sharply focused on Malaysia’s growth model as being primarily the cause for unsustainable development because it was determined by social relations of production tied to political control from the top-bottom by the ruling class elite including the higher echelons of the bureaucracy.

This is an excellent analysis on the poverty of the political economy debate to which I could hardly meaningfully add. Instead, it might be more useful to apply some of the more important arguments in the context of my own experiences in the development over the past fifty years.

The Malaysian Experience

Soon after independence there is no question that the entire economic planning formulation and project implementation had to be based on the economic growth model. This was because the model was strongly endorsed by a team of Consultants from Harvard University attached to the Economic Planning Unit, who arranged for a cadre of senior officials in the planning agencies to attend a specially structured course leading to a Masters’ Degree in economic development.

In this process it can be argued that the officers were not only “fed” but ‘force fed’ by growth model theories of Rostow
and others, because as far as is known, little if any serious consideration was given to exposing the officers to comparative perspectives of other alternative theoretical orientations, in an academic course structure that was not examination based nor thesis oriented.

The formulation of the New Economic Policy brought the growth model under sharper focus because of the need not only on growth but more importantly on distribution as well. It was argued that particularly because of the inter-ethnic nature of the population the growth model drawing basically on “supply side economics” was not sustainable if there was to be fair and equal distribution for all in a level playing field.

In the debate that ensued to achieve this however, James Puthucheary’s work on the ownership and control of the economy was the justification for a form of state intervention in the economy that would also enable the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at the eradication of poverty for all groups irrespective of ethnic affiliation.

This distributive developmental perspective, as might be expected, was not acceptable to all planners with the EPU still holding on essentially to the growth model but with further re-enforcement by a team of Norwegian experts headed by Just Faaland who is generally “credited” with drafting the NEP as we know of it. In fact it is true to say that the genesis of the narrow and restrictive thinking behind the affirmative action policies of the NEP in promoting “bumiputraism” can be traced to the Norwegian group.

There was at the same time a more “enlightened” approach by Agoes Salim towards the NEP. His contention was that the participation and involvement of Malays in the economy was more important as stake holders and that becoming billionaires through obtaining quotas and contracts (or “doing nothing”) was not sustainable. Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that Agoes, who was the first Secretary –General of the Ministry of National Unity, subsequently ‘moved out’ of the civil service.

Tun Razak, strongly advocated the two main dimensions of the NEP but emphasized that Malays cannot dominate the development process. For the Malays to play a leading role it is necessary for the leadership to be “elite determined by ability, aptitude and commitment to the nation as a whole”. It is well known that Razak was fully aware that the political elitist tendencies among the Malay ruling class that might negate the so-called “umbrella” concept in helping other Malays, and accordingly initiated the establishment of a network of social institutions to empower the rakyat to be directly involved in power sharing positions across the board and thereby to counter political elitism.

Najib’s budget provisions however have once again failed to channel resources towards this objective of self –empowerment of the rakyat to enable direct involvement and participation in the democratization of all social institutions for the development of a level playing field for all as under Razak’s original Red Book proposals. Indeed, by ignoring this fundamental need to incorporate the demands and aspirations of the raykat in the revolution of rising expectations in the bottom-top development and in the implementation process, the Najib administration may be said to be guilty of the basic requirement of good government for national integration and national unity in Malaysia.