Eight reasons why Pakatan lost
Bridget Welsh, Malaysiakini
The BN deservedly should claim and savour yesterday’s victories. The combined gains in Galas and Batu Sapi show significant swings across ethnic minorities, which proved to be decisive in determining the final outcome.
This is the first major turning point in the political stalemate between the BN and Pakatan Rakyat among all of the 13 by-elections since March 2008.
From the ground, it was clear that the BN had the advantage in both seats, and I expected both wins. The results, however, are even larger than expected.
What happened?
It is important to understand that these two seats typify a particular form; they are mixed semi-rural seats, like Hulu Selangor. They represent the opposition’s political periphery – places where the opposition won unexpectedly in 2008 – and, importantly, are the current battleground for national power.
The BN’s double victories showcase their ability to win this type of seats and hold onto its dominant national position in government.
Allow me to elaborate some factors that shaped the results in what I have grouped under the ‘semi-rural’ category combined with some changes in the national political landscape.
1) Machinery and the personal touch
The BN was ready for these two battles. They had, as one party worker described, the “guns and bullets” to deliver the results. The preparation for the campaign began early and unlike the opposition which did not develop momentum until days into the campaign period, the BN was off and running from the onset.
The opposition was stretched and imported their party workers from nearby, as they lacked effective local networks. The fact that the two by-elections occurred on the same day weakened the collective Pakatan effort and points to the weakness of Pakatan nationally.
What is particular to semi-rural seats is the presence of the personal touch. BN’s strong local networks provided voters in these areas with people whom they could connect to and trust. The grassroots house-to-house approach worked well in these semi-rural areas.
In contrast, the deluge of Pakatan ‘outsiders’ did not translate into effective machinery on the ground, particularly since most came for only a few days and campaigning lacked the needed personal touch.
2) Political infighting
What weakened the opposition further was infighting, especially in Sabah. Granted, both sides had divisions, but Umno and BN were able to manage them better. They focused on their target – victory.
Cooperation was noticeably missing in the opposition, with people staying away from supporting the team. This was most obvious in Batu Sapi, where physical violence occurred at the start of the campaign, but this occurred as well in Galas, where PAS was internally conflicted about the need to win Galas and expend resources.
The divisions in the opposition extended beyond internal component parties to the relationship among the opposition actors, as tensions simmered over the choice of contesting in Batu Sapi and dissatisfaction over the pace of the campaign in both places.
One factor in particular that overshadowed the contests was PKR’s party polls. The Batu Sapi contest showed the negative impact of non-consultative decision-making. Many in PKR are still smarting from the perceived bully tactics of the West Malaysian party leaders. The failure to put aside personal ambitions and build bridges for the good of the party contributed to the losses in both places.
The electoral contest was a proxy arena for the internal party fight between an approach that is exclusionary and one that is more inclusive and decentralised. In order to win the political periphery, the opposition needs to be united. The unity in the BN made their victories decisive.
3) The role of local warlords
BN gains should also be credited to the local warlords – Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa Aman. These leaders reinforced the personal touch and provided the organisational base and local understanding for effective campaigns. They minimised infighting. What is striking here is the deficit of local leadership on Pakatan’s part.
The BN has returned to its approach of working effectively through decentralised decision-making and it earned dividends.
4) Limited appeal of national leaders
The crucial role of local intermediaries stands in contrast to the minimised impact of national leaders.
While Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin was on the ground, and should be credited for his success in the campaign, the absence of Prime Minister Najib Razak due to chicken pox was striking. He won by not going to the ground and making the campaign about the BN as a whole, not his persona or personal leadership.
For Pakatan’s national leaders, their presence did not yield the expected results. This was most obvious in Batu Sapi and for PKR leader Anwar Ibrahim, who was not able to move the party’s vote share to striking distance of victory as the BN won three times more votes.
While these leaders did win support, the contests showed that they cannot do it alone. The two by-elections are a wake-up call to Pakatan leaders to move beyond focusing on their own personal successes and issues and to lay out the policies and platforms to address the needs of the electorate.
Voters are rightly concerned that for Pakatan – with the slogan ‘The road to Putrajaya’ – the focus is on winning personal power for themselves, as it remains unclear exactly how supporting them will benefit voters.
