“Watermelon” and “Sympathizer” Effect

In politics, you never appear weak if you are indeed weak 

Original text by Tay Tian Yan, Asst. Chief Editor, SinChew Daily
Translated text by Gilbert Yeoh-Tan

Something to test your intelligence:

Najib said that if Barisan National wins only by a narrow margin in the coming election he may lose his job. That being, his job as the Prime Minister. Do you believe him?

Similarly, Lim Kit Siang said that Pakatan Rakyat will win in 7 states, 5 that they won in the past election, plus Perlis and Negeri Sembilan. Do you believe him?

As for me, I remain reserved on these 2 statements.

Uncle Lim’s declaration on winning the 7 states may stem from his overconfidence, but it could as well be the tool used to boost confidence.

In politics, you never appear weak if you are indeed weak; instead, you should boast to appear ‘more beefed’. If you have only 3,000 troops, you should create an illusion to let others think that you have 30,000 under your command.

Many voters suffer from the so-called ‘watermelon effect’. When one watermelon is cut into two and are asked to pick only one, they tend to pick the halve that seems bigger. This reaction can be viewed as ‘steering towards feeling safer’.

This is especially apparent among non-die-hard voters and swing voters who have yet to make up their minds, they tend vote for the party that seems more likely to win, but not the ones deemed ‘yang akan kalah’.

If PR appears to be losing ‘gas’ even before the election starts, then surely they are doomed right from the beginning.

It may be more tactically sound for PR to actually concentrate their resources on the states they currently control. They should put their star candidates and election resources to defend their strongholds instead of fighting the wars of unknown winning-chances.

Penang and Kelantan are PR’s strongholds. They need to put a steadfast defense in Selangor and Kedah, and they have to recapture Perak.

PR may as well be already exhausted to achieve their goals in the above 5 states as they have used up considerable amount of resources and manpower there.

They may expect certain rewards in Johor, Sabah, and Sarawak; but their hopes in Perlis and NS should remain doubtful.

Should PR decide that they want to go all-out, there is a possibility that they leave their strongholds unguarded and the consequences may be harmful.

As the party in power, BN, despite having the advantage, should remain low-profile. If they hit too hard they risk provoking antipathy among the voters (remember how the voters treated Abdulah Badawi 5 years ago?)

Hence, if BN insists that they will win handsomely in the coming election, the swing voters may think of voting for PR to ‘balance’ the situation since BN is going to win anyway.

This thought, at first sown in individual minds, may gradually grow to be a collective trend that leaves unforeseeable impacts.

This is the reason Najib does not want to appear too aggressive. He has tied his personal political goals with the nation’s economy and politics transformation in hope to convince the voters to let him stay for at least one more term to finish what he started.

Furthermore, he has announced that, if he does not win marginally, he may lose his job. It seems to me he is trying to harness the ‘sympathizers’ votes.

All in all, with his personal image and political achievement, Najib still has the chance to fight for more votes. And now may yet be his best time to further foster his relationship with the Rakyat.

 

郑丁贤‧西瓜和悲情效应

考一考大家的眼光：

纳吉说，如果国阵只是险胜，他可能会失去工作。所谓的工作，当然是首相的位子。

问题是，你相信吗？

同样的，林吉祥说，民联可以赢得7个州政权；就是上届赢的5州，再加上玻璃市和森美兰。

你相信吗？

这两者，我都保留。

林伯伯声称可以拿下7州，或许出自他过人的信心，然而，更可能只是一种信心喊话。

政治上，如果形势比人弱，千万不能漏馅，而必须把自己催谷得又肥又壮，兵马只有3千，也要制造假象，让人以为兵马3万。

多数选民有所谓的“西瓜效应＂，就是西瓜切开来，当然是挑大边的，那是寻求一种安全感。

特别是中间选民，以及游离选民，他们往往倾向于更有机会获胜的政党，而不是投给一个没有胜算的政党。

如果民联开战前，就已经泄气，那就没有甚么大戏可以唱了。

在实际策略上，或许民联领导人应该把资源集中在现有执政的州属，把最有胜算的候选人，以及竞选资源和机器，用在捍卫本身的大后方，而不是用于自己没有把握的战场。

民联的堡垒是槟城和吉兰丹；它要坚守的是雪兰莪和吉打，另外要收复的是霹雳。

要捍卫这5个州属，已经让它陷入苦战，资源和人力都不足。

至于玻璃市和森美兰，恐怕已经力有不逮；至于柔佛、沙巴和砂拉越，只能期望能有若干斩获，取得一些突破。

一旦民联走得太远，去得太尽，只怕大后方空洞化，反而出现危机。

至于国阵，作为执政党，它拥有较大的优势，反而要采取低姿态的策略。

太过强势的出击，会引起选民的反感，这是5年前许多大马选民留给阿都拉的一个注脚。

如果国阵强调它会大胜，那么，中间和游离选民会认为，既然国阵如此稳固，不如把票投给民联，制造平衡效果。

一旦这种个别想法累积成为集体心理，就会造成意想不到的冲击。

纳吉不敢表现太强势，他把自己的政治前途，和经济转型和政治转型挂勾，要说服选民给他至少多一个任期，让他完成工作。

而且，他声称如果战绩不佳，赢得不多，还会“工作不保＂。

这就有点悲情牌的味道了。

毕竟，阿吉哥凭个人形象和政绩，还可以争取选票，这是向人民博感情的时候。