Why Malaysia isn’t afraid of China (for now)

ARCHIVES 2013

By admin-s On Apr 30, 2013

Rarely have the Chinese made their presence felt at the extremities of their maritime claims in the region. And never have they brought such firepower with them—four vessels led by the PLA Navy’s latest amphibious landing ship, the Jinggangshan.

The Strategist

On 26 March 2013, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a major naval exercise in the South China Sea, close to what China calls Zhengmu Reef. News of the exercise would have been lost amid the constant stream of reports on the disputed waters had it not been for the fact that Zhengmu Reef, which is known as Beting Serupai in Malay and James Shoal in English, lies at the southernmost tip of China’s expansive maritime and island claims in the South China Sea. More specifically, it’s some 80 kilometres away from Malaysia and 1,800 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. Rarely have the Chinese made their presence felt at the extremities of their maritime claims in the region. And never have they brought such firepower with them—four vessels led by the PLA Navy’s latest amphibious landing ship, the Jinggangshan.

While serving as a sign of China’s rising assertiveness, the exercise was also notable for the distinct lack of a visible public reaction from Malaysia. Neither the Malaysian Prime Minister nor the Foreign Ministry has made even the most perfunctory statement on the matter. Never mind that a Malaysian naval offshore patrol vessel, the KD Perak, monitored the exercise and issued orders for the PLA Navy to leave the area. And never mind that a standard protest may have been quietly expressed through diplomatic channels. In contrast to how such exercises are greeted in Hanoi and Manila, the Malaysian public response has been a deafening silence. So what explains Malaysia’s muted reaction to this overt demonstration of China’s growing power?

Part of the explanation lies in Malaysia’s perception of its relationship with China. It’s seen as unique—perhaps even deserving the term ‘special’—among those of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. This isn’t to say that Putrajaya sees itself as having the most intimate of ties with Beijing, and there’s little doubt that Cambodia and Myanmar have closer political relations with China. Nor does it mean that nobody in Malaysia sees China as a potential long-term security challenge. As one might expect, there are some within the Malaysian Armed Forces who observe China’s military build-up with a degree of unease.

But there’s certainly a sense that Malaysia and China have implicitly agreed to pay heed to each other’s legitimate interests and go to extra lengths to avoid playing out their disputes through the media. Furthermore, there’s a perception, at least on the Malaysian side, that the relationship is highly prized and historically significant.