Revisiting “democracy in plural societies” in transforming Malaysia
Will the minimal use of identities in election campaigns eliminate the ethnic and religious cleavages so deeply embedded in dominant ideologies and institutions in a Malaysian polity?
Beyond the short-term goals of winning elections, eliminating corruption, and ultimately achieving democracy, these are important deep-seated issues that need to be addressed among not only foreign observers like myself, but also Malaysian elites and citizens.
Kikue Hamayotsu, New Mandala
A well-established proposition in political science is that it is difficult to achieve and maintain stable democratic rule in a plural society (Lijphart 1977). Some also argue that competitive elections, a minimal procedural condition in a modern democracy, could potentially generate more instability and violence rather than rectifying them in such a society (Snyder 2000). Whoever comes into government, the challenges of maintaining delicate ethnic relations will remain the same in a deeply divided society like Malaysia. In spite of extraordinary economic, socio-cultural and political transformations over the past decades, the basic characteristics of Malaysia’s “plural society” and ethnic-based party mobilisation have remarkably remained the same. Will Malaysia’s increasingly “competitive” elections and more credible and assertive “multi-ethnic” opposition bring about more equity and stability, as promised by the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR)?
Beyond the short-term goals of winning elections, eliminating corruption, and ultimately achieving democracy, these are important deep-seated issues that need to be addressed among not only foreign observers like myself, but also Malaysian elites and citizens. What will a Malaysian democracy look like? Will the democracy à la PR be significantly different from a polity we have known in Malaysia under the BN in terms of equality and equity? Have issues, ideologies, and institutions of identity, ethnicity, and in particular religion, receded or increased as a result of more competitive elections? Do the opposition leaders have adequate political capital to settle these issues skilfully (and differently) to achieve a new democratic regime and peaceful society? Do they have a better vision of state and nation that they agree and commit themselves to in a long run? In order to address these questions beyond the immediate outcomes of the election, this essay seeks to place the recent political development in broader perspectives that pertain to the questions of identity, religion and ethnicity, based on the available data and tentative observations.
1. The political use of ethnicity and religion in election campaigns: political learning and ideological moderation
On the positive side, one thing that could be highlighted and commended in the recent election is that the use of parochial and divisive ethnic and religious identities and symbols for short-term electoral gains was not as significant as pessimistic observers may have expected. Sure, there were “racial” rhetoric and accusations circulated in media primarily by pro-regime forces. However, these racial and ethnic rhetoric and mobilisation aimed at inciting ultra-nationalistic sentiments has proven to be ineffective or counterproductive, as seen in the defeat of the ultra-nationalist candidate, Ibrahim Ali in his home state of Kelantan. Moreover, violence related to ethnic or religious divisions has largely been restrained. Overall, the PR has been reasonably successful in overcoming and limiting narrow parochial ethnic and religious sentiments in running election campaigns. Instead, they have focused on pragmatic—and universalistic—programs such as clean and fair elections, elimination of corruption and good governance.
Have such universalistic campaigns of PR worked for all the component parties to bring such an impressive electoral showing for the opposition? My quick calculation of the results seems to suggest some interesting (potentially worrying) findings and dynamics, beyond what already have been obvious and discussed, which merit our close observation and explanation. First, DAP is a clear winner while PAS is not, although PR contested parliamentary seats under single tickets. In the Peninsular (except Sabah and Sarawak), DAP won 28 (78%) out of 32 parliamentary seats they contested at the national level. By stark contrast, PAS won only 21 (36%) out of 59 seats they contested while PKR won 24 (41%) out of 58 seats (see Table 1 below). Second, so-called rising young “progressive” reformist leaders from PAS, Dzulkefly Ahmad, Mohamad Sabu, and Salahuddin Ayub, have lost not only in UMNO’s strong hold, Johor, but also in Muslim-dominant districts in Kedah and Selangor where PR won handsomely both at the national and state levels.
With everything equal, these outcomes may not simply be attributed to strategic miscalculation (e.g., a wrong candidate in a wrong constituency) or dirty tactics of the government. Although more thorough research needs to be done, one thing is clear; PAS is not gaining much from their position in the coalition and their new “reformist” identity and leadership they have chosen to adopt at the expense of their traditional “Islamist” identity, policies, and leadership. PAS’ support base remains exclusively in Kelantan as it was 10 years ago in contrast to a prediction that it has been transformed into a more open and national party.
Despite the deep ideological (and religious) differences and long-standing distrust between predominantly Chinese DAP and Islamist PAS, the PR has learned to work and stay together through what can be called “political learning” as well as a power-sharing formula they have crafted since 2008. Both parties, PAS in particular, have somewhat moderated their ideological positions and put aside their immediate goals they had been fighting hard for a number of years to gain popular support in their respective religious/ethnic communities. Now, it is argued, PAS is dominated by reformist and more urban (and secular-educated) young politicians. For them, an Islamic state based on Syariah (Islamic laws) is no longer the future of Malaysia. This new direction was a crucial step for survival of the coalition thus far because otherwise DAP would not have agreed to stay together. On the other hand, DAP’s national vision, “Malaysia for All”, has been revitalised to make a central slogan for the opposition. As the result seems to suggests, it worked so well to win the hearts and minds of Malaysian electorates especially in urban areas. These are clearly positive developments unimaginable a couple of decade ago, developments that the ruling politicians could not ignore, as seen in their “One Malaysia” slogan and programs. A big question is what would be an option for PAS now. Are the political and ideological costs they are paying small enough for them to stay as they are?
