PR’s ‘liberal’ problem
The problem arises for liberals when citizens exercise their autonomy in a way that turns out to be hostile to autonomy itself. These rights permit citizens to develop homophobic, racist, or other views that deny the autonomy of others. But if these citizens try to gain enough support to turn these views into law, the liberal state steps in to prevent them from doing so. It will declare such laws unconstitutional and liberal courts will strike these down.
Rueban Balasubramaniam, The Malay Mail
Right-wing defenders of ethno-Islamist rule criticise Pakatan Rakyat (PR) for advancing a “liberal” political programme. They say that under such a programme, society would be too individualistic and subversive of important and traditional values.
And this would not only challenge a Malay-Muslim vision of society but other conservative Malaysian values. In gist, PR’s political programme would threaten the ethical identity of the state.
How should we respond to this critique?
Perhaps we might dismiss this critique as grounded in false assumptions about the ethical character of a group. All groups consist of individuals. And since individuals have rational and moral powers of judgement, which they are bound to exercise in ways that lead to disagreement about ethics, morality, religion, and politics, group-life will be marked by disagreements about value or what may be termed the fact of pluralism. Therefore, it is false to suppose that there is anything that can be identified as a group ethic or morality.
This objection to the critique is powerful but perhaps too quick. For, like it or not, ethno-Islamists have an actual basis of support in people who worry about the rise of the liberal state in Malaysia. And there are others who have nothing to do with the ethno-Islamist agenda who think the rise of a liberal society may pose dangers to their particular values and beliefs.
What exactly is this worry about liberalism?
Jurgen Habermas, arguably the world’s leading living political philosopher, has identified precisely the kind of problem that I think is buried in the right-wing ethno-Islamist critique of PR, the worry that liberalism turns out to be hostile to those who adhere to values and beliefs that are hostile to liberalism itself.
Liberalism’s core value is individual autonomy, that is, the individual’s rational and moral powers to set, revise, and pursue his or her plan of life. This ideal explains liberalism’s emphasis on individual rights and freedoms as necessary for the meaningful exercise of these powers. These rights are central to the individual’s powers of autonomous self-realization.
It follows that liberals affirm the importance of the fact of pluralism as the mark of a healthy liberal society. If people are given a set of rights so they can attain their autonomy, then they are apt to also disagree about ethics, morality, religion, and politics. It is therefore important for the liberal state to embrace the principle of “toleration” in ensuring ample space for different ethical, moral, religious, and political perspectives as part of a healthy political culture.
The problem arises for liberals when citizens exercise their autonomy in a way that turns out to be hostile to autonomy itself. These rights permit citizens to develop homophobic, racist, or other views that deny the autonomy of others. But if these citizens try to gain enough support to turn these views into law, the liberal state steps in to prevent them from doing so. It will declare such laws unconstitutional and liberal courts will strike these down.
Hence, as Habermas argues, contemporary liberalism is defined by a serious contradiction: it grants individuals rights to pursue their individual autonomy and encourages the fact of pluralism. But because there is no guarantee that the pluralism that will arise is “reasonable” (disagreement within the boundaries of liberal autonomy) and may instead be “deep” (disagreement beyond the boundaries of liberal autonomy), the liberal state will end up simultaneously encouraging and discouraging the fact of pluralism. In this, the liberal state will seem oppressive to those who are drawn to deeply pluralistic views.
In its best iteration, I think the ethno-Islamist critique of PR alludes to this contradiction. Here, I am not suggesting that ethno-Islamists self-consciously make this objection. But their critique does signal a very serious political challenge for PR that goes beyond everyday political swashbuckling, the challenge that PR’s political programme is intolerant of deep pluralism.
The challenge is serious because it has to do with the prospects of long-term social co-operation in Malaysia. Any plausible political programme for Malaysia must adequately respond to the fact of deep pluralism and must be able to engage perspectives that may turn out to be hostile to the liberal ideal of autonomy. Otherwise, citizens whose perspectives are not engaged are apt to view any proposed political programme as a threat to their values and sense of identity so they will not find it rational and reasonable to support that programme.
Currently, PR responds by saying that right-wing ethno-Islamists misunderstand liberalism. But this response does not address the present problem, which requires that PR explain the values that underlie its political programme and show how those values justify the practical aspects of that programme. As well, the explanation must reveal why it is both rational and reasonable for deeply disagreeing citizens to endorse the programme.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that PR has addressed this complex and daunting “liberal” challenge. As a coalition that wishes to construct a meaningful political alternative for Malaysians, it must address this challenge or run the risk of reproducing the evils of oppression and intolerance that increasingly beset Malaysian politics. PR must resist the impression that it may be intolerant of groups that do not endorse the ideal of liberal autonomy if it seeks to achieve its goal of supplying an adequate political alternative to the status quo.
