Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 6)
Raggie Jessy
May 13, 1969 (continued..)
You know, a politician is like a cattle breeder. He milks the cow that nourishes his minion. And when he finds that there is no milk, he starts to milk the bull. And somehow, his minion would remain nourished.
Many have attributed the Tunku’s resignation as Prime Minister on the 22nd of September 1970 to the riots of 13th May 1969. The official version has it that the riots were corollary to spontaneous acts of violence that were triggered by opposition parties. It was implied that these parties were permeated by communist insurgents who had turned districts into a chaos of rebels.
Now, a truth of omission is, essentially, a lie. Indeed, the violence was triggered by a heavily boisterous and incendiary procession through Malay enclaves with excessive taunting and racist exchanges. These processions were eclipsed by DAP supporters who shouted derogatory mantras that incensed the Malays and had them wrecking vengeance on the Chinese. It is not certain, however, if communist insurgents did in fact infiltrate DAP’s guard, or to what extent they were responsible for the upheaval.
But inter-racial adversity is not something a fairy godmother comes and afflicts the nation with at the wave of a wand. No. The riots were really spawned off a succession of events that included the 1964 riots in Singapore, the 1967 Penang hartal (economic boycott), the Pudu riots of 1968, the funeral procession of 1969 and the victory parade, also in 1969. These incidences exacerbated racial intolerance and inflamed to madness the animosity between the Chinese and Malays.
Today, we have UMNO Malays blaming the Chinese over the 2008 and 2013 electoral tsunamis. Likewise, the Chinese are blaming UMNO for inciting racial intolerance and fortifying its supremacist culture. They have accused MCA of being a dog on a leash that fawns over its UMNO overlords. But historians are yet to address the root cause to the bad blood between the Chinese and the Malays. Specifically, many historians have failed to assess the impact of transitions in political structures on the post-independence Chinese and Malays.
British Malaya just before independence came under the purview of British colonialists who kept the races domiciled in their respective socio-economic dominions. Back then, the Chinese never considered themselves to be subjects of the Monarchs and preferred that they be regarded as traders or businessmen.
The fact that the Tunku professed an advocacy to ‘pluralism’ and a ‘multi-cultural society’ on the basis of citizenship gave the Chinese hope of equitable governance in the years to come. But circumstances occasionally caused the Tunku’s to sway from these precepts, leaving the Chinese sceptical of his leadership and his commitment towards nation building on an all-encompassing scale.
One thing remains certain; back in the day, the Tunku had a rather bureaucratic approach towards authority that balanced itself on aristocracy and western dogma. But it was his aristocratic lineage that took precedence when and where it concerned the question of Malay authority and polity. Thus, you would find that the Tunku personified ‘Malaya for the Malays’ at times while advocating ‘pluralism’ and a ‘multi-racialism’. These were perhaps the most salient of traits during his tenure as Prime Minister.
The fact that the Tunku appeared un-Islamic may have convinced the Chinese that he was really a nonconventional Muslim who simply wished to appease both the Chinese and the Malays from the crossroad. It was well known that the Tunku, a womaniser, had a coterie of Chinese associates with whom he spent much of his leisure hours drinking and playing Mah-jong.
The Tunku’s UMNO had gradually espoused a somewhat supremacist approach, something that became manifest in 1959. Back then, the Tunku’s Alliance almost succumbed to scission following a crisis just before the General Elections when the Tunku denied MCA’s demand for a greater representation in parliament. As the Tunku had it, he would have UMNO contesting in the elections even if it meant doing so without MCA by its side.
The decision by several MCA leaders to go ahead and contest in the General Elections caused a split within the party. Soon, the Chinese began distancing themselves from MCA. They became convinced that they were being misrepresented by its leaders, who they knew would kowtow to UMNO elitists for a piece of the action. As a matter of fact, MCA’s share of parliamentary seats plunged from 26% in the 1964 General Elections to 9% in the 1969 General Elections. Much of MCA’s share eroded into the hands of DAP and Gerakan leaders. The Tunku had never anticipated the debacle, always believing that the Chinese were unwavering with their support for him and the Alliance.
It became clear that the Chinese had ditched the Tunku’s brand of politics for quite a while, possibly since the 1959 crisis. Like I have said before, widespread dissent among the races isn’t built overnight, but spawns off a succession of events that span several years. But the Tunku may not have been aware of the decline in support amidst a political fabric that lacked alternative platforms for the Chinese. These platforms came to be with the advent of DAP (legitimized in 1966) and Gerakan (legitimized in 1968). Soon, the Chinese felt that they would be better represented by an opposition that championed a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’.
A large number of Malays, on the other hand, began to feel that the Tunku had granted the Chinese far too much leeway, leading them (the Chinese) to believe that the Malays were intimidated by their bearing. In fact, Mahathir had once written an open letter to the Tunku, demanding that he step down as “the Malays…hate you for giving (the Chinese) too much face.” The Malays felt the Chinese to be positively subversive and communal in their exploits.
Mahathir never saw eye to eye with the Tunku since before independence. As a matter of fact, Mahathir probably landed himself into the Tunku’s black book back in 40’s during the Malayan Union days. According to one account, Mahathir cheesed the Tunku off when he corrected a letter that was drafted by the latter, meant for the colonial secretary.
Mahathir was apprehensive of a future with the Tunku leading the Alliance. Though he never spelt it out, it was rumoured that he despised hereditary ruling classes that prevailed over UMNO’s higher rungs. Apparently, he feared the ritualistic traditions of incumbency and succession that were endemic to the nobles, and saw the Tunku to personify the very aristocratic trait he abhorred. As Mahathir appeared to evince in the later years, he would rather have the powers of Monarchs severely curtailed.
Likewise, the Tunku never had high regards for Mahathir. To the Tunku, Mahathir was neither an aristocrat nor did he embody values endemic to aristocrates. Such was the temperament of UMNO elitists back in the day that one would have to be a blueblood to be of reputable rank within the party.
Over the years and since 1959, Mahathir began to perceive how policies the Tunku had put in place vexed both the Chinese and the Malays. He realised that the Tunku was naive and could not discern the decline in Chinese and Malay support for him. Rather than working constructively with the Tunku to remedy the situation, Mahathir went on to make capital off the antipathy between the races, estranging the Chinese further apart from the Malays.
In due time, the Chinese began to perceive Mahathir to be among a generation of young Turks who were extremist and positively anti-Chinese. His bitter and denunciatory speeches in parliament became the turning point in Chinese-Malay relations and may have set the stage for of the Tunku’s eventual exit from office and the 13th of May 1969 riots.
To be continued…
Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 5)
Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 4)
Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 3)
Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 2)
Mahathirism: The Cancer that Plagues the Nation (Part 1)
