Bersih 4: a win-win outcome?
Every day that it avoids serious contestation, and every day that it survives overt challenge (or is not made to face one), it further consolidates itself, “normalises” the conditions under which it operates, and increases its legitimacy.
Clive Kessler, The Malaysian Insider
Mass rallies over the weekend proved a moderate victory for both sides of Malaysian politics.
It is far too early for any definitive judgement to be passed on last weekend’s events.
First, a process of patient, thoughtful and honest analysis is necessary.
And even if a clear verdict were possible, it would have to come from people closer to the action than I was.
All I can suggest is a very preliminary and tentative opinion from afar. And what I have to offer is not a simple view or verdict.
As I tried to follow events from Sydney, it occurred to me that the net result of the weekend’s action may be quite paradoxical. Meaning mixed. And mixed in an odd way.
The overall result of the Bersih weekend may have been – in different ways for each of them, of course – a modest but significant victory for both sides.
On Bersih’s side, the public rally – in effect, a mass popular vote, “on-foot”, of no-confidence in their government – seems to have succeeded. Not necessarily because of the great size of the turnout – which seems to have been appreciably smaller than the numbers who came out for the second and third Bersih rallies – but because it occurred at all.
The announced program of activities for Bersih 4 was ambitious: a rolling, continuing public rally spread over two days, under plans that would require very substantial numbers yet which would necessarily disperse the attendance and impact, rather than concentrate the presence and focus effect of the public demonstration of dissent.
There may have been good practical reasons for adopting that approach. Perhaps the lack of focus would make the action harder to disrupt, it may have been thought. But it was a strategic risk. It increased the event’s vulnerability to strong action.
And the police authorities made the most of their opportunity. As the protest weekend drew near, the intimations of strong counter-action by the police became ever more assertive and fear-inducing.
Those dire warnings from the police and their political masters may well have had a substantial effect. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many felt intimidated, were dissuaded, and decided to stay at home.
Yet despite those discouraging effects, the Bersih events took place, with some significant public support.
More, they took place peacefully. The eruption of violence was avoided, because the demonstrators proved disciplined, good-natured, and determined to stay within sensible bounds, and not to offer any provocation or ground for police intervention.
And, for their part, the police too apparently decided to “play a cool hand” and not to act forcefully without any clear and substantial reason to intervene.
The net effect of the non-confrontational attitude on both sides was to achieve something notable. With tacit police cooperation and consent, Bersih 4 showed that it is possible to hold a peaceful public assembly, rally and oppositional political demonstration.
In a place where the official view has long been that no such thing is possible, this represents a significant achievement. And once the point is established, can it later be denied? Will it become a de facto expectation?
