Commentary: Malaysia opposition party PAS’ overconfidence might be its undoing
Before the August state elections, PAS presumed that Bersatu was still necessary to give the coalition a veneer of professionalism, so that it could appeal to the broader electorate, chiefly the urban centres of West Malaysia. However, the state elections might just fuel PAS’ overconfidence that it could contest in all Malay majority seats on its own.
James Chai, CNA
This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.
It is tempting to think of the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition’s rise as a linear trajectory to Putrajaya as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) now stands at the peak of its powers. But if we have learned anything from history, it is that we should never underestimate PAS’ ability to get in its own way.
The internal rupture between PAS and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) is already starting to show. PAS had started to assume the role of de facto senior partner in PN – contesting the majority of the seats in the August state elections (126 out of 245 seats) and winning most of them (105 out of 126).
Soon they will not be comfortable with inequality between seat count and leadership positions, with Bersatu currently assuming key leadership positions in PN, such as the chairman, parliamentary opposition leader and secretary general.
Before the August state elections, PAS presumed that Bersatu was still necessary to give the coalition a veneer of professionalism, so that it could appeal to the broader electorate, chiefly the urban centres of West Malaysia. However, the state elections might just fuel PAS’ overconfidence that it could contest in all Malay majority seats on its own.
For instance, Negeri Sembilan, a state deemed near-impossible for PAS to win before August, saw PAS making more effective gains than Bersatu. Out of the 5 state seats won by PN, 3 were won by PAS, even though the party contested in fewer seats than its partner (13 against Bersatu’s 17).
As is characteristic of PAS, a party that prioritises political expediency under Abdul Hadi Awang, they are starting to perceive Bersatu as a partner delivering less than what it takes.
In Kedah’s state government, PN was only willing to give Bersatu just three executive council positions (down from five positions previously). This created an uproar in the backroom during negotiations.
Bersatu’s relevance to PAS will continue to fade as it loses its funding value to the coalition after its party bank accounts were frozen in January and subsequently seized in April. Without a state government to its name, Bersatu will constantly rely on PAS’ goodwill to build its influence.
STRATEGY OF COMBINING MALAY PARTIES?
It is no surprise why PAS is now actively reaching out to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) again. Previously, PAS had worked with UMNO under the Muafakat Nasional charter, only to see the relationship end after two years with lots of name-calling and bad blood.
PAS recognises the fact that it could not complete the last mile to Putrajaya without either absolute control of Malay-majority seats (120 out of 222 seats) or substantial non-Malay support. The latter is unlikely to be delivered by its multiracial counterpart Gerakan any time soon.
This means that PAS is relooking at combining the Malay parties of PAS, Bersatu, and UMNO as its current strategy.
The only problem, of course, is PAS’s unenviable track record in party and coalition partnership.
It is the only mainstream party that has never stayed with any entity it has worked with. This is unlike the coalition of Parti Keadilan Rakyat, Democratic Action Party and Amanah, and the coalition involving UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association, the Malaysian Indian Congress and Gabungan Parti Sarawak.
PAS also has the tendency to be domineering and bulldoze its way even in situations demanding equal partnership. The party’s boycott of the Gerakan president’s campaign in the Malay-majority seat of Bayan Lepas is proof of its unwillingness to compromise and concede.
