Competing Sectarianisms in Malaysia
Legal immunity for the Mufti reflects an undemocratic move to shield a religious figure from legal accountability, positioning the Mufti above other public officials.
A new bill seeks to tighten Islamic orthodoxies, imperiling the country’s reputation for religious tolerance and inclusion.
In July, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Unity government, through Minister for Religious Affairs Mohd Na’im Mokhtar, introduced the new Mufti Bill for the Federal Territories. The bill, the next reading of which is expected in Parliament later this month, has raised concerns about growing sectarian competition among Malay elites.
The bill is contentious for several reasons. It requires the Federal Territories Mufti, who advises the king and federal government on religious matters, to strictly follow the Sunni denomination, specifically the Ash’ari creed and Shafi’i jurisprudence, while granting the Mufti qualified immunity from legal action.
This sectarian provision sidelines a wide range of alternative Muslim jurisprudences, including Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi that are widely practiced elsewhere, as well as sects like Salafism, Shiism, and other non-denominational forms of Islam, despite their presence in Malaysia and recognition in some parts of the Muslim world. Furthermore, legal immunity for the Mufti reflects an undemocratic move to shield a religious figure from legal accountability, positioning the Mufti above other public officials.
This shift toward theocracy in Malaysia is not unprecedented. Dr. Maznah Mohamad’s book, “The Divine Bureaucracy and Disenchantment of Social Life: A Study of Bureaucratic Islam in Malaysia,” underscores the rapid bureaucratization of Islam during from the 1980s onward. Driven by substantial public funding, religion has now infiltrated every aspect of public and private life. However, the Mufti Bill marks a more explicit sectarian turn in the bureaucratization of Islam since the 2000s, aiming to institutionalize Sunni Ash’arism as the state-sanctioned version of Islam.
Competition Among Malay Elites
To grasp the motivation behind the bill, it’s essential to understand the sectarian competition among Malaysia’s Malay-Muslim elites.
First, within political factions, the bill reveals how religious elites under the Anwar-led Unity government, guided by the minister for religious affairs, a former Sharia chief judge of Malaysia, are proactively advancing the Sharia system through new legislation.
This push comes from pressure by far-right factions, particularly the Perikatan Nasional (PN) opposition, led by the Malaysian Islamist party (PAS). They accuse the religious elites of Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan-Barisan Nasional coalition of colluding with a liberal-leaning, pro-Chinese coalition. Recent high-profile federal court rulings – such as the Nik Elin case that annulled provisions in Kelantan’s Sharia Enactment on 16 moral offenses, the Iki Putra case that overturned Selangor’s Sharia Enactment’s provision on anti-sodomy, and the Loh Siew Hong case that annulled the unilateral conversion of children to Islam – have intensified perceived threats to the Sharia system and fueled this legislative drive. The strategy seeks to consolidate support from religious elites, bureaucrats, and conservative Muslim voters.
Adding to the tension is the divisive #RUU355 Bill, which seeks to expand Sharia criminal jurisdiction nationwide and impose harsher punishments. This bill continues to gain momentum under Anwar’s administration.
Second, religious factions, particularly muftis and bureaucrats, are locked in a power struggle, exposing the deep-seated sectarian rivalry between dominant Ash’ari factions and minority Salafi factions, despite the fact that both belong to Sunni Islam. This long-standing intra-faith divide continues to shape Malaysia’s Muslim majority.
The Mufti Bill received strong backing from 12 state Muftis and support from pro-Ash’ari networks, including the Association of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Aswaja) and the Sarawak Scholars’ Association (Ittihad).
In contrast, Perlis, a known safe haven for Salafism, opposed the bill. Salafism thrives there due to the influence of Mufti Asri Zainal Abidin, a leading Salafi advocate. He draws support from the state’s monarchy, local politicians, mosque networks, and foreign Salafi patrons, including the controversial exiled preacher Zakir Naik.
Despite internal divisions between quietists influenced by Saudi Salafis and modernists aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi factions united against the bill. Prominent Salafi figures like Mufti Asri Zainal Abidin, UPSI lecturer Rozaimi Ramle and Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)’s chief for Kangar city of Perlis, have led the resistance. While these factions often clash over political issues, they recognize that the Mufti Bill, which applies to federal territories, could set a precedent for other states, curtailing their influence nationally. Ironically, though Salafis framed their opposition as a defense of “freedom of thought,” their main concern remains preserving their own sectarian power.
